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Background and context 
The  purpose  of  this  brief  is  to  examine  whether  HR/VP  Ashton’s  Proposal for a 
Council  decision  establishing  the  organisation  and  functioning  of  the  European 
External Action Service (EEAS) of 25 March 2010 is in legal accordance with the 
stipulations of the Lisbon Treaty on development cooperation.  
 
The focus of the development issues around the EEAS is unsurprising. The inclusion 
of the EEAS in Article 27(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and mention 
that it should comprise officials from ‘relevant departments’ of the Commission and 
the General Secretariat of the Council, as well as diplomats from the Member States, 
carried the obvious implication that the organisation and structures for development 
cooperation would be influenced by the emergence of the EEAS. In particular, the 
potential disappearance of most of the Commission’s Directorate-General External 
Relations  (DG  Relex)  meant  that  many  questions  pertaining  to  the  management, 
programming and implementation of development cooperation would be on the table.  
 
The fact that the EEAS would inevitably be a major change in the external relations of 
the Union by, in effect, introducing a major new institution (although officially sui 
generis)  led  to  often  polarised  debates  about  the  need  to  protect  the  Community 
model or to promote the Service as the core of a new coherent and comprehensive 
approach to the challenges of the twenty-first century in external action. 
 
One clear opinion contends that ‘The [Lisbon] Treaty extends no powers to the EEAS 
or the High Representative to implement stages of Development Cooperation’.
1  This 
line of reasoning is supported by a legal analysis prepared by UK law-firm White & 
Case for a coalition of almost the entire community of development NGOs, led by 
Concord  (the  umbrella  group  of  all  European  development  groups),  CIDSE  (the 
                                                 
1 Mirjam van Reisen, Note on the legality of inclusion of aspects of EU Development Cooperation and 
Humanitarian Assistance in the European External Action Service (EEAS), Brussels, Europe External 
Policy Advisors, 5 March 2010.   2 
alliance  of  European  Catholic  development  charities),  Aprodev  (its  Protestant 
counterpart) and Eurostep (the secular aid coalition): 
 
‘The EAS may be in breach of objectives and competencies laid down in the 
Lisbon Treaty. The role of the EAS under the EU treaties is restricted to the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which represents only 
part  of  the  EU’s  external  action.  Development  co-operation  is  outside  the 
scope of the CFSP and therefore the EAS has no capacity in respect of it. The 
Ashton  proposal,  which  is  intended  as  an  instrument  setting  out  the 
organisation and functioning of the EAS, cannot alter areas of competence as 
defined  under  the  treaties,  such  as  the  ‘exclusive  competence’  of  the 
commission  in  development  co-operation  activities.  Detracting  from  the 
exclusive  competence  of  the  commission  would  require  a  formal  treaty 
amendment.’
2 
 
The  question  is  whether,  in  light  of  certain  provisions  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  the 
standing case-law of the European Court of Justice, and the ‘political orientation’ on 
Ashton’s proposal reached by Member States in the Council on 26 April, there is any 
reason to amend this conclusion. In order to address this issue it is necessary to first 
understand both the spirit as well as the letter of the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
Shared competence and duty of loyal cooperation 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s powers on development cooperation are treated as 
shared competences and not – as claimed above – as one of the areas of exclusive 
competences listed in Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). Article 4 TFEU (on shared competences) notes in paragraph 4 that, 
‘In the areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the Union shall have 
competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy’. Within the limits of 
pre-emption set by Article 2(2) TFEU and Protocol No. 25, the Member States are 
bound to exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its 
competence. Conversely, when the Union has taken action in a certain area, the scope 
of this exercise of competence only covers those elements governed by the Union act 
in question and therefore does not cover the whole area. In practical terms this means 
that the EU may conduct an autonomous policy in these areas, which does not prevent 
the Member States from exercising theirs in areas not yet regulated by the EU, but nor 
does it reduce the Union’s policies in these areas to mere complementary policies. 
 
The shared and co-existent nature of the competences in the field of development 
cooperation was perhaps more clearly visible at the time of Article 181 of the Treaty 
establishing  the  European  Community  (TEC):  ‘Within  their  respective  spheres  of 
                                                 
2 As quoted in Leigh Philips, ‘Development NGOs issue legal warning over new EU foreign service’, 
EU Observer, 27 April 2010.   3 
competence, the Community and the Member States shall cooperate (…)’ (emphasis 
added).
3 
 
This  reference  highlights  another  crucial  element:  the  autonomy  of  the  EU’s 
development  cooperation  policy  is  therefore  restricted  by  the  duty  of  loyal 
cooperation between the Union and its Member States, which has been elaborated in 
this  specific  domain  in  Article  210(1)  TFEU:  ‘In  order  to  promote  the 
complementarity and efficiency of their action, the Union and the Member States 
shall  coordinate  their  policies  on  development  cooperation  and  shall  consult  each 
other on their aid programmes (…). Member States shall contribute if necessary to the 
implementation of Union aid programmes.’ Article 210(1) TFEU can be considered a 
lex specialis of Article 4(3) TEU: ‘Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, 
the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in 
carrying  out  tasks  which  flow  from  the  Treaties.  (…)’.  In  the  field  of  external 
relations (incl. CFSP ex Art. 24(3) TEU), this duty has been further developed by the 
ECJ in its jurisprudence.
4 We will come back to this point later on. 
 
Mainstreaming the eradication of poverty in EU external action 
The main provisions addressing EU development cooperation appear in Title III of 
Part V of the TFEU. Several features are worth noting. First, the binding nature of 
Article 205 TFEU, the opening provision of Part V:  
 
‘The Union’s action on the international scene, pursuant to this Part shall be 
guided  by  the  principles,  pursue  the  objectives  and  be  conducted  in 
accordance with the general provisions laid down in Chapter 1 of Title V of 
the Treaty on European Union’ (emphasis added).  
 
In Article 208(1) TFEU, the main stipulation on EU development cooperation, this 
reference to the binding general principles of EU external action reappears: 
 
‘Union  policy  in  the  field  of  development  cooperation  shall  be  conducted 
within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external 
action. The Union’s development cooperation policy and that of the Member 
States complement and reinforce each other. 
Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the 
reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall 
                                                 
3 This  has  been  acknowledged  by  the  European  Court  of  Justice  (ECJ)  in  a  series  of  landmark 
judgments. See, e.g., joined cases C-181 & 248/91 EP v Council (Bangladesh) [1993] ECR I-3685; 
Case 316/91 EP v Council (EDF) [1994] ECR I-625: ‘The Community’s competence in that field is not 
exclusive. The Member States are accordingly entitled to enter into commitments themselves vis-à-vis 
non-member States, either collectively or individually, or even jointly with the Community.’ 
4 See, e.g., Case C-124/95 Centro-Com [1997] ECR I-81; C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] 
ECR I-4805; Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (‘MOX plant’)[2006] ECR I-4635; and C-45/07 
Commission v Greece (IMO) [2009] nyr; and C-246/07 Commission v Sweden (PFOS), judgment of 20 
April 2010.   4 
take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that 
it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.’ 
 
Development cooperation is thus set in the context of the principles and objectives of 
EU external action, which includes fostering ‘the sustainable economic, social and 
environmental  development  of  developing  countries,  with  the  primary  aim  of 
eradicating poverty’ (Art. 21(2d) TEU). Since the eradication of poverty is accorded 
the status of a primary objective of the Union, rather than one of the three objectives 
mentioned previously in Article 177 TEC, it applies to all areas of EU external action, 
including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In each of these areas 
account shall have to be taken of development cooperation which greatly strengthens 
these provisions over the former treaty. The need to mainstream the principles and 
objectives underpinning development cooperation also implies that stress has to be 
put on policy coherence, not only in development but in EU external actions more 
generally.
5 This  raises  the  questions  of  who  should  be  responsible  for  any  such 
coherence, what is understood by this and how it will be conducted.  
 
Policy coherence 
The proposal of 25 March 2010 notes that the legal basis for the EEAS stems from 
Articles 27(3) and 21(3) of the TEU. The former tasks the EEAS with assisting the 
High Representative in fulfilling her mandate and invites the Council to ‘act on a 
proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and 
after obtaining the consent of the Commission’.
6 The latter creates a legally binding 
obligation (‘shall’) for the Union to ‘ensure consistency between the different areas of 
                                                 
5 See in this respect already the Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action, CONV 459/02, 
Brussels, 16 December 2002, p. 8: ‘The Working Group, while recognising that development policy 
has its specific purposes, which are reflected among the principles and objectives of EU external action, 
underlines the need for ensuring coherence between development cooperation and other aspects of EU 
external action as well as external aspects of internal policies, since development assistance should be 
considered as an element of the global strategy of the Union vis-à-vis third countries.’ It was noted that 
EC/EU funds constitute around 10 per cent of global overseas development assistance (ODA), but the 
contributions of the Member States (45 per cent) mean that the overall figure amounts to 55 per cent of 
global  ODA. T h e r e  w a s  t h e r e f o r e  p e r c e i v e d  t o  b e  t h e  n e e d  t o  r e i n f o r c e  ‘ c l o s e  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  a n d  
complementary activities in order to improve the efficiency of overall EU aid’. Ibid, p. 27, para. 54. In 
one  of  the  more  extensive  analyses,  the  need  for  synergy  between  the  long-term  approach  of 
development cooperation, geared towards addressing the structural root causes of poverty, and the 
short-term  crisis  management  aspects  shaping  crisis  prevention  and  political  dialogue,  was  noted. 
Interestingly, the legal aspects were not raised as a significant barrier to any of the options discussed.
  
See  M.  Gavas  and  E.  Koeb,  Setting  up  the  European  External  Action  Service:  Building  a 
Comprehensive  Approach  to  EU  External  Action,  European  Centre  for  Development  Policy 
Management and the Overseas Development Institute, 16 March 2010, p. 11; see also Fiche on Specific 
Arrangements Concerning the EEAS staff, 12 October 2009, p. 6. (no other author information given). 
6 Although the Treaty only mentions consultation with the European Parliament, it is clear that the 
accompanying and necessary changes to the Staff and Financial Regulations, which will be required 
before the EEAS can operate, will require Parliamentary assent. This will give the European Parliament 
potential influence when in the ongoing discussions surrounding the structure of the Service. Aside 
from the context of the regulations, the EEAS is otherwise a ‘functionally autonomous body of the 
European Union’ (Art. 1 of the  Proposal for a Council decision establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the European External Action Service).   5 
external  action  and  between  these  and  its  other  policies.  The  Council  and  the 
Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect’. 
 
An annex to the European Parliament’s ‘non-paper’ of 18 March 2010 (the so-called 
‘Brok/Verhofstadt’  paper  on  the  putative  EEAS,  which,  from  the  Parliament’s 
perspective, was largely ignored in the proposal for a Council decision tabled the 
following week)
7, the EP reproduced Article 21 TEU, highlighting paragraphs (2d) 
and (2f).
8 With regard to the former, it was argued above that the inclusion of goals 
such as the elimination of poverty as objectives of the Union, instead of general aims 
as under the previous treaties, strengthened the focus on development cooperation. 
The  latter  clearly  signified  that  the  focus  should  be  on  longer-term  perspectives, 
designed to promote sustainable development, rather than on shorter-term aims. An 
opinion of a cross-party group of five prominent MEPs built on this last argument by 
stating that ‘The EAS must be ambitious and include all aspects of external policy – 
including development. It is only through creating greater coherence that the EU will 
be able to have a voice and a role in the world. The proposed artificial separation of 
part  of  the  development  competences  between  EAS  services  and  Commission 
services is a recipe for incoherence.’
9 
 
It is obviously too soon to tell whether the Council’s draft proposal, if adopted, will 
make foreign and development policy more effective, but we should remind ourselves 
of the entire logic of the Lisbon Treaty exercise, which is the creation of a more 
coherent, effective and visible EU on the international scene. The EEAS remains key 
to this aim. 
 
Policy autonomy? 
The idea, advanced in various quarters, that development cooperation should retain its 
autonomy and ought not to be contaminated by the CFSP is, quite frankly, puzzling.
10 
                                                 
7  Non-Paper,  European  Parliament,  18  March  2010  available  at 
<http://bruxelles.blogs.liberation.fr/Note_on_EAS_Outline%20FINAL%201803.doc>. 
8 Which  state,  respectively,  that  the  Union  ‘shall  foster  the  sustainable  economic,  social  and 
environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty’ and 
that the Union shall ‘help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the 
environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable 
development.’ 
9 See  <http://www.alde.eu/index.php?id=42&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=22793>.  The 
members  of  the  cross-part  group  were  Elmar  Brok  (EPP  rapporteur),  Guy  Verhofstadt  (ALDE 
rapporteur), Hannes Swoboda (S&D) and Rebecca Harms and Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Greens/EFA). 
10 See,  e.g.,  Report on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service, 
Committee on Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament, A7-0041/2009, 20 October 2009, p. 4, para. 
H, where rapporteur Elmar Brok notes that ‘the Lisbon Treaty singles out development cooperation as 
an  autonomous  policy  area  with  specific  objectives  and  on  an  equal  footing  with  other  external 
policies.’ The report called on the Commission, in its preparatory work on the EEAS, ‘to put its full 
weight as an institution behind the objective of preserving and further developing the Community 
model  in  the  Union’s  external  relations’.  Ibid, p .   5,  para.  N.2.  However,  the  report  included  two 
opinions,  from  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  and  Development  respectively.  The  former 
recommended to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs that ‘there are compelling reasons to include   6 
Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, consistency problems were the 
obvious  consequence  of  the  pillar  structure  of  the  Union.  The  division  between 
political (CFSP) and other/economic (EC) external relations was never easy to make, 
but  at  the  same  time  the  Union  and  the  Community  were  forced  to  use  different 
instruments and decision-making procedures, thereby challenging the EU’s potential 
as a cohesive force in international relations.
11 The ECOWAS judgment revealed the 
difficulties in separating foreign and security policy from other external policies and 
provided  the  opportunity  for  the  ECJ  to  shed  some  light  on  the  distribution  of 
competences between the EC and the EU qua CFSP.
12 In the event, the Court found 
that  by  using  a  CFSP  decision  on  the  EU  support  to  ECOWAS  (Economic 
Community of West African States) in the fight against the proliferation of small arms 
and light weapons, the Council had encroached upon the Community’s competence in 
the field of development cooperation, thus violating the provisions of Article 47 TEU. 
The Court preserved the acquis communautaire in the classic manner and argued that 
once foreign and security policy elements can be based on the EC Treaty, they should 
not be based on CFSP. 
 
However, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Community 
has  disappeared  together  with  the  pillar  structure  of  the  EU.  In  terms  of  legal 
hierarchy, the TEU and the TFEU are on a par. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty has 
introduced a new delimitation provision in Article 40 TEU, which not only underlines 
the need for a preservation of the acquis emanating from the TFEU (cfr. the old Art. 
47 TEU), but adds that the Union’s competences in CFSP should also be respected: 
 
‘The  implementation  of  the  common  foreign  and  security  policy  shall  not 
affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the 
institutions  laid  down  by  the  Treaties  for  the  exercise  of  the  Union 
competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. 
                                                                                                                                          
development  policy  in  the  new  service’.  Ibid., O p i n i o n  o f  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  o n  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s ,  
Rapporteur  Annemie-Neyts-Uyttebroeck,  19  October  2009,  p.  12,  para.  6(b).  The  Opinion  of  the 
Committee on Development did not contradict that of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, but noted that 
it cannot be taken for granted that ‘the new service will attach equal importance to attaining the EU’s 
development policy objectives and the Millennium Development Goals’. Ibid, p. 14. The Committee 
considered  it  important  that  explicit  reference  should  be  made  in  the  Parliament’s  report  to 
development,  to  the  obligations  to  work  towards  poverty  reduction  in  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  and  to 
‘upholding development cooperation as an autonomous policy area, on an equal footing with other 
policies in the field of international relations’. Ibid. 
11 There are numerous examples in which the institutional separation between CFSP and EC led to 
problematic decision-making and unclear situations for third parties. See, e.g., Cases T-306/01, Ahmed 
Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3533; 
T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission, [2005] ECR II-3649; T-47/03 Sison and 
T-327-03 Al-Aqsa, [2007] ECR II-73; T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du people d’Iran v 
Council, [2006] ECR II-4665. 
12 Case C-91/05, Commission v. Council [2008] ECR I-3651. For a thorough discussion of the legal 
implications of the case see C. Hillion and R.A. Wessel, ‘Competence Distribution in EU External 
Relations after ECOWAS: Clarification or Continued Fuzziness?’, 46 Common Market Law Review 
(2009), pp. 551-586.    7 
 
Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not 
affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the 
institutions  laid  down  by  the  Treaties  for  the  exercise  of  the  Union 
competences under this Chapter.’ 
 
This provision thus no longer subjects CFSP to any competence previously held by 
the Community. Article 40 TEU places CFSP on an equal footing with other EU 
external relations policies and brings an end to the default setting of, for instance, EU 
policy in development cooperation. The legally binding obligation for the Union to 
ensure consistency between the different areas of external action and between these 
and its other policies again provides the overarching rationale. 
 
In practice, the need for autonomy when it comes to development cooperation is also 
contestable given the growing emphasis within the Commission, and elsewhere, to 
look at issues from a thematic or horizontal perspective. The emphasis on human 
security within the Commission serves as an example. 
 
Finally, consideration of development cooperation as an autonomous field of interest 
in EU external relations may well be counterproductive since it would ignore critical 
trade aspects, those pertaining to climate change or the environment and security, all 
of which have profound bearings upon not only the EU’s development policies but for 
sustainable development as well. This point appears to be substantiated by Article 
208(1) TFEU, cited above. 
 
Based on the Lisbon Treaty, and in counter-distinction to the autonomy position, it 
could  be  argued  that  the  Treaty  points  in  precisely  the  opposite  direction  by 
mainstreaming development-related perspectives into foreign policy considerations.  
 
Representation, strategic programming and management of external policies 
The substance of the legal objection, referred to at the beginning, dwells upon the 
Commission’s competence, laid down in Article 17(1, 6
th sentence) TEU, to ‘ensure 
the Union’s external representation’, with the exception of the common foreign and 
security policy, which falls to the High Representative (Art. 27(2) TEU), assisted by 
the EEAS (Art. 27(3) TEU), and the President of the European Council (Art. 15(6) 
TEU). 
 
It is difficult to conceive of the European Parliament endorsing the wholesale transfer 
of  former  Community  competences  to  intergovernmental  decision-making. 
Conversely, it is equally far-fetched to imagine the Member States standing idly by 
while  the  shared  parallel  competences  on  development  cooperation  disappeared 
totally into the clutches of the Commission and the European Parliament. The more 
interesting  debate  thus  pertains  to  the  partial  management  by  the  EEAS  of   8 
development  policy  programmes  and  whether  this  constitutes  a  violation  of  the 
Lisbon Treaty.
13 In this case it is argued here that the Commission’s duty to manage 
programmes has to be balanced against the more general duties befalling the HR/VP, 
as well as the Council and the Commission, to ensure consistency in the external 
actions of the Union. 
 
The issue of whether there are any definitive grounds to assess the proposal as illegal, 
due to the division of responsibilities between the Commission and the EEAS, has to 
be approached with caution since there is a lack of clarity about many structural, 
organisational and procedural aspects of the sui generis Service and its relations with 
other  EU  institutions.  Based,  however,  upon  the  proposal  of  25  March  and  the 
background positions of the institutions and a number of the Member States
14 and 
outside  institutions  and  academics,  as  well  as  the  Lisbon  Treaty  itself,  there  are 
reasons to doubt the illegality of the proposal as it stands. 
 
The issue is whether or not the proposed Council decision violates the letter of the 
Lisbon Treaty by transgressing, in particular, Article 17(1) TEU, which bestows upon 
the Commission, inter alia, the duty to execute the budget and manage programmes, 
to  exercise  coordinating,  executive  and  management  functions,  and  to  initiate  the 
Union’s  annual  and  multiannual  programming  with  a  view  to  achieving 
interinstitutional  agreements.  The  external  representation  of  the  Union,  with  the 
exception of the CFSP and other cases provided for in the treaties, falls within this 
long list of executive tasks. One could therefore be forgiven for believing that the 
Member  States,  when  negotiating  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  had  intended  to  endow  the 
Commission only with the competence to represent the Union when implementing its 
external policies.
15 
 
The proposal of 25 March 2010 states in Article 8(1) that, ‘In the framework of the 
management  of  EU  external  cooperation  programmes,  which  remain  under  the 
responsibility  of  the  Commission,  the  High  Representative  and  the  EEAS  shall 
contribute to the programming and management cycle’ for a number of thematic and 
geographical  instruments.
16 The  instruments  include  the  DCI,  EDF,  ENPI,  the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument for 
                                                 
13 Part  of  van R e i s e n ’ s  p o s i t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  T reaty  makes  no  legal  differentiation  between 
implementation and management and that any division of responsibilities between the EEAS and the 
Commission is ipso facto illegal. Bearing in mind that her opinion pre-dates the proposal for a Council 
decision  by  some  three  weeks,  the  legality,  or  otherwise,  of  this  passage  depends  upon  the 
interpretation of key words such as execution of the budget and management of programmes, as well as 
‘coordinating, executive and management functions’.  
14 A number of other formative documents, such as the Swedish Presidency report to the European 
Council on the EEAS discussed financial and programming issues but, while noting the need to take 
‘account of the nature of the instruments concerned’, did not raise any looming legal concerns. See 
Council of the European Union, Presidency Report to the European Council on the European External 
Action Service, 14930/09, 23 October 2009, p. 4. 
15 Ultimately, it is up to the ECJ to decide on the width of interpretation of the sixth sentence of Art. 
17(1) TEU. 
16 Emphasis added.   9 
Cooperation  with  Industrialised  Countries  and  the  Instrument  for  Nuclear  Safety 
Cooperation.  The relevant article then states: 
 
‘... throughout the whole cycle of programming, planning and implementation 
of these instruments, the High Representative and the EEAS shall work with 
the  relevant  members  and  services  of  the  Commission.  All  proposals  for 
decision will be prepared through Commission procedures and submitted to 
the Commission for decision’.
17 
 
Thus, the proposal allocates to the EEAS particular (not exclusive) responsibility for 
preparing the Commission decisions on the strategic, multi-annual steps within the 
programming cycle. More specifically, this covers the first three of the multi-annual 
steps within the programming cycle (country and regional allocations; country and 
regional  strategy  papers;  and  national  and  regional  indicative  programmes).  The 
agreement upon the ‘political orientation’ in the Council on the EEAS of 26 April 
2010 marks a general consensus upon the role of the EEAS amongst the Member 
States.
18  
 
The objection that the EDF and DCI, which in budget terms represent the largest 
portion of the overall external action budget, imply a different and essentially long-
term approach to programming, whereas much of the programming in other aspects of 
EU external action is annual or shorter-term, also appears to be accommodated by the 
proposal for a Council decision. In both cases any proposals ‘shall be prepared by the 
relevant services in the EEAS and in the Commission under the direct supervision 
and  guidance  of  the  Commissioner  responsible  for  Development  Policy  and  then 
jointly submitted with the High Representative for decision by the Commission’.
19 
Similar stipulations apply in the ENPI context with reference to the Commissioner for 
Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy. 
 
The Commissioner for Development is given an elevated status when it comes to 
preparing  thematic  programmes,  which  shall  be  under  the  guidance  of  the 
Commissioner for Development in agreement with the High Representative and other 
relevant  Commissioners.  An  attached  Explanatory  Memorandum  to  the  proposed 
Council decision notes that ‘horizontal Communications on Development Policy will 
be  prepared  by  the  relevant  Commission  services  under  the  guidance  of  the 
Commissioner for Development, and presented to the Commission in association with 
the relevant Vice-Presidents and Commissioners’.
20 
 
                                                 
17 Ibid., Article 8(2) (emphasis added). 
18 Council  of  the  European  Union,  3010th  Council  meeting,  General  Affairs,  8967/10  (Presse  89 
Provisional), Luxembourg, 26 April 2010. 
19 Ibid., Article 8(4) (emphasis added). 
20 Explanatory Memorandum, Council Decision Establishing the organisation and functioning of the 
European External Action Service, 25 March 2010.   10 
Thus, the proposal for a Council decision does not prima facie remove either the 
‘management  functions’,  the  Commission’s  initiatory  rights  or  those  of 
implementation. Article 210(2) of the TFEU, which permits the Commission ‘to take 
any useful initiative’ to promote coordination between the Union and the Member 
States  on  development  cooperation,  is  seen  as  further  proof  that  the  Commission 
should  be  the  implementer  of  development  policy.  However,  there  is  nothing  to 
suggest in either the proposal for a Council decision or the explanatory memorandum, 
that any such transferral of implementation of development cooperation instruments 
to the EEAS has been seriously entertained. 
 
Based  upon  the  proposal,  substantial  management  and  implementation  tasks  are 
retained  by  the  Commission,  with  the  EEAS  playing  a  role  in  the  programming 
aspects. Programming can be conceived of at the political level, where strategic goals 
are  connected  with  more  specific  policy  towards  a  country  or  region  (cfr.  the 
competence of the European Council ex Art. 22 TEU), while the actual management 
of projects (especially the financial aspects) and execution will be retained by the 
Commission.  The  withdrawal  of  the  controversial  organigram  of  the  prospective 
EEAS means that structural issues are left to be discussed. It would seem reasonable 
to  anticipate,  based  on  the  proposal  and  the  explanatory  memorandum,  that 
Directorates D-E of the Directorate-General for Development will be transferred,
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will the relevant units responsible for aid programming and management and pan-
African issues (this would include institutional, migration and governance issues).  
 
Until further precise details emerge, it is thus difficult to contest that the proposed 
arrangement is in contravention to either the spirit or the letter of the Lisbon Treaty. 
The Commission’s powers in this regard pertain to the initiation of such programming, 
but not to the entire programming cycle. 
 
If, for the sake of argument, the proposal were deemed illegal, a number of objections 
could surface. Under Article 18(4) TEU, the High Representative has the obligation to 
ensure the ‘consistency of the Union’s external action’. Article 21(3) TEU extends 
this  duty  to  the  Council  and  the  Commission  who,  ‘assisted  by  the  High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that 
consistency and shall cooperate to that effect’. It could reasonably be claimed that this 
would  not  be  possible  if,  in  the  case  of  development  cooperation,  all  of  the 
programming were conducted by the Commission, unlike many other areas of EU 
external action. If the HR/VP were not able to propose changes in country allocations 
or high-level programming priorities, she could legitimately claim that this would 
complicate her ability to execute these obligations under the Treaty.  
 
                                                 
21 Directorate D (ACP II – West and Central Africa, Caribbean and Overseas Countries and Territories) 
and Directorate E (Horn of Africa, East and Southern Africa, Indian Ocean and Pacific).   11 
The  High  Representative,  who  is  also  a  Vice-President  of  the  Commission,  is 
‘responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external 
relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action’ (Art. 18(4) 
TEU). It could be argued that the Commission and the EEAS are essential for the 
execution of her mandate as well for her coordination tasks. In unveiling his new 
Commission  in  November  2009,  it  was  clear  to  President  Barroso  that  three 
Commissioners in particular (for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy; 
for  International  Cooperation,  Humanitarian  Aid  and  Crisis  Response;  and  for 
Development) should execute their mandates in close cooperation with the HR/VP ‘in 
accordance with the treaties’.
22 
 
The HR/VP also has an additional role in relation to the Foreign Affairs Council 
(FAC) which will deal with development-related issues. In her capacity as chair of the 
FAC she represents the overall interests of the EU in its external actions and she is 
assisted by a Commissioner from the external relations group. Her role and that of the 
FAC is a further way of promoting the role of development in the overall external 
actions  of  the  EU.  The  absence  of  any  substantive  EEAS  (programming)  role  in 
development  would  complicate  the  tasks  of  coordination  between  policy  areas 
enormously and, with the Member State presence in mind, would also weaken the 
essential  connection  between  the  development  policies  of  the  Member  States  and 
those of the Union. 
 
The argument that the Treaty, with the exception for CFSP, ‘does not provide for a 
split  of  responsibilities  between  the  EEAS  and  the  Commission’,  and  thus  no 
arrangements to allow a sharing of policy implementation under the Treaty, could also 
be  challenged  on  the  grounds  that  Article  27(3)  TEU  is  short  and  in  many  ways 
incomplete. This is why it provides for the rather cumbersome but comprehensive 
consultation  and  consent  procedures  with  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Commission respectively, prior to any Council decision. The Treaty does not prejudge 
what that proposal or subsequent consultations shall include although it had already 
been  agreed,  in  principle,  that  the  EEAS  should  have  unified  desks  covering  all 
countries and regions of the world in the joint Barroso/Solana Joint Progress Report in 
June  2005.
23   In  the  event  that  all  of  the  programming  and  implementation  of 
instruments  in  the  development  cooperation  area  were  to  be  done  through  the 
Commission, that would imply substantial duplication of desks – with desks in DG 
Development  addressing  development-related  aspects,  while  desks  in  the  EEAS 
would support the non-development related aspects. This, at the very least, seems to 
violate the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty and the underpinning logic of the EEAS as a 
means to enhance the coherence of EU external action. It should also be borne in 
                                                 
22 See ‘President Barroso unveils his new team’, Press Release, IP/09/1837, Brussels, 27 November 
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23 Joint Progress Report by the High Representative and the Commission to the European Council on 
the European External Action Service, 9956/05, 9 June 2005.   12 
mind that the primary purpose of the desks is to assist the HR/VP, but they shall also 
support the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission.  
 
Finally, the attribution of all programming aspects of development cooperation to the 
Commission  could  have  potentially  negative  connotations  for  the  Member  States. 
Since the EU’s total overseas development and assistance (ODA) is around 55 per 
cent of global ODA, the Union can legitimately claim to be a major player. But, of 
this figure 45 per cent comes from the Member States and the remaining 10 per cent 
from the EU. From a consistency point of view it would therefore make most sense to 
attribute a substantial programming role to the EEAS in which the Member States will 
be involved in the form of temporarily assigned national diplomats. This would have 
the double benefit of not only enhancing consistency between EU external action 
policies but also development cooperation related ones between the Member States 
and the EU institutions. 
 
Conclusions 
The  above  overview  of  arguments  surrounding  development  cooperation  in  the 
context of the Lisbon Treaty suggests that it is an unfinished story. For this reason it 
is difficult to reach any hard and fast conclusions but, thus far, it is reasonable to 
suggest that the proposal for a Council decision of 25 March 2010 does not constitute 
a violation of the spirit or letter of the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
The  fundamental  debate  appears  to  be  of  a  more  political  nature,  concerning  the 
extent  to  which  development  cooperation  should  be  autonomous  or  more  closely 
integrated into the EU’s overall external actions. Such arguments tend to be polarising, 
with some seeing advantages to closer integration of development goals into the wider 
objectives of EU external actions, while others (notably NGOs in the development 
area)  see  the  emergence  of  the  EEAS  as  holding  the  potential  to  sideline  and 
contaminate development-related concerns.  
 
This brief has argued a position closer to the former by arguing that the Lisbon Treaty 
holds the potential to ‘developmentalise’ EU external relations and that, on balance, 
the Treaty represents an opportunity rather than a threat. These positions are broadly 
in line with the conclusions reached by ECDPM at their September 2009 meeting 
with senior development officials when it was observed that, ‘One tendency was to 
suggest  that  a  strong  autonomous  development  Commissioner  with  the  tools  to 
promote development effectiveness was the prime need. Others emphasised that the 
key  issue  should  be  [policy  coherence  for  development]  and  the  secret  was  to 
maximise the development sector’s leverage on other policy sectors within the EU’.
24   
 
                                                 
24 Informal Senior Officials Meeting, The implications of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty for EU 
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It has also become difficult, if not artificial, to insist upon autonomy for development 
cooperation, a policy which for some considerable time now has raised cross-cutting 
political and legal issues (just think of Somalia and Sudan as examples). Attempts to 
hermetically seal development cooperation under a Commission blanket would fly in 
the  face  of  the  spirit  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty  which  remains  the  creation  of  a  more 
coherent, effective and visible Union on the international scene. 
 
The proposals, thus far, appear compliant with the Lisbon Treaty. Although many of 
the precise details regarding the EEAS have yet to be worked out, there is no evidence 
thus  far  that  there  is  any  intention  to  fundamentally  alter  the  Commission’s 
implementation role when it comes to development cooperation, nor to rewrite any of 
the rules for the management of EDF funds. It is reasonable to anticipate that the 
geographic, aid programming and management aspects of the Directorate-General for 
Development will constitute part of the EEAS. This is entirely consistent with not 
only text of the Lisbon Treaty but its spirit as well.   
 
The  debate,  therefore,  should  centre  less  on  issues  of  legality  and  more  on  how 
development-related interests can be upheld in the EEAS and, more generally, EU 
external  actions.  There  is  also  plainly  a  need  for  more  discussion  about  how 
development and cooperation issues will be handled within the EU delegations. 